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SUMMARY OF CONTENTS

A review of the major Soviet political addresses and propaganda themes since January 1951 provides no indications that the USSR will make any real move toward relaxing international tensions. Soviet propaganda has steadily continued to prepare Orbit peoples for eventual war with the West. The tone is softened or hardened from time to time but the basic anti-Western themes remain unchanged, and the United States is consistently pictured as the chief aggressor.

Export restrictions imposed by both the Tokyo and Peiping governments have now largely dispelled the hope held by Japanese and Chinese trade interests that an expanding and profitable commerce could exist between the two nations despite all political pressures. While Japan will undoubtedly continue to cooperate with the US in export controls, it will eventually pattern its trade policy after that of the Western European countries.

Britain's effort to secure added assistance on the dollar gap from the independent members of the sterling area at the January meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers will meet resistance, since the overseas countries are expected to demand priority consideration of the problem of their sterling balances and their need for capital goods.

Despite Polish Security Police action anti-Government activity in Poland during the past three months seems to have been on at least as high a level as a year ago. These varied reports of resistance from all parts of Poland indicate that the popular will to resist has not been broken. [redacted] 25X1

Secret Big Four disarmament talks began in Paris during the past week after somewhat tardy Soviet acceptance of the proposal for discussions which Pakistan, Iraq, and Syria had advanced in the UN General Assembly's Political Committee.

If any possibility exists for Soviet concessions during this session of the General Assembly, it is likely that they will be made in the field of general disarmament, where territorial questions are not directly involved. In such discussions, the Soviet Government might hope to obtain from the West either assurances that as part of a general agreement on reduction of armaments no further action would be taken to expand the scope of NATO, or else it might hope that, as a result of a general armaments agreement, the Western powers would not be able to pursue their objectives for defense with the same solidarity as in the past. Judging from experience, any disarmament agreement with the USSR will be negotiated only after the most bitter wrangling and hard-headed horse trading extended over many months. The negotiations will be characterized by frequent setbacks, and have at least an equal chance of complete failure.

For the present, Moscow is leaving nothing to chance and has again managed to have the last word in its series of protests against Western rearmament. Since 1 October, scarcely a week has passed without the dispatching of one and sometimes two notes to nations cooperating in NATO. On 30 November the latest Soviet note to Ankara repeated an earlier protest against Turkey's joining NATO and declared that this action "will inflict serious damage on Soviet-Turkish relations."

Following the Soviet example, Rumania, Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria have protested the US Mutual Security Act as evidence of the aggressive intentions of the United States. The notes charge that the Act constitutes proof that the US is financing exile groups to carry out espionage and sabotage in Eastern Europe. The USSR is already utilizing the incident of the US C-47 military aircraft, which it has now admitted was forced down in Hungary by Soviet fighters, as additional evidence of American espionage operations.

In Eastern Europe the week's events were highlighted by the arrest of Rudolf Slansky, former Secretary-General of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, on charges of anti-state activity. Slansky's fall from power marks the first time since the war that major political purges of the Satellite parties have included a top Moscow stalwart.

In the Czechoslovak party and government reorganization in September, Slansky's powerful position of Secretary-General was abolished and its

functions transferred to Party Chairman Klement Gottwald and a newly created 7-man Politburo of which Slansky was made a member. Slansky was also made a Vice-Premier.

Slansky's arrest may be attributed to several factors. In his position as Secretary General, he had the responsibility for successful implementation of broad economic policies. His downfall, which occurred at a critical point in the sharpening economic crisis caused largely by the heavy demands which the USSR has placed upon the Czechoslovak economy, can probably be traced to Czechoslovakia's failure to resolve this dilemma. Premier Zapotocky, who is a member of the new politburo, immediately after the September reorganization attacked economic failures in a series of important speeches which blasted weak points in the present situation and dealt extensively with remedies.

Unlike other Satellite parties, the Czechoslovak Communist Party had no politburo prior to the reorganization in September. Power was centralized in Rudolf Slansky, as Secretary-General of the party. There is some evidence that Slansky, while demanding strict adherence to Soviet directives, was not an efficient administrator. Party organization, therefore, possibly suffered from his emphasis on discipline and conformance rather than on competence. This weakness was pointed up in recent weeks by strong and pointed criticism of party organization for which he was ultimately responsible. A shakeup through the district and regional levels of the party is indicated, and in all probability an extensive purging of personnel will occur in the near future.

The problem of personal struggle for power also has certain applications to the Slansky case. For some time, the leading pre-war Communists, who included President Gottwald, Minister of Foreign Affairs Siroky, and Premier Zapotocky, have been distinguished as a group from Slansky and another top Communist, Bedrich Geminder, who have worked in the less publicized key positions of power, and there were numerous reports of rivalry between the two groups.

For whatever reasons Slansky was purged, it is clear that the responsibility for solving Czechoslovakia's current economic and party problems has been placed squarely upon Gottwald and Zapotocky. Their recent statements indicate that they are fully aware that their future depends upon their success in satisfying Moscow's demands, regardless of the cost to Czechoslovakia.

WORLD COMMUNISM: SOVIET PROPAGANDA SUGGESTS NO MOVE TO SOFTEN TENSION

A review of the major Soviet political addresses and propaganda themes since January 1951 provides no indications that the USSR will make any real move toward relaxing international tensions. Soviet propaganda has steadily continued to prepare Orbit peoples for eventual war with the West. The tone is softened or hardened from time to time in response to Western actions in Korea and the build-up of NATO, but the basic anti-Western themes remain unchanged, and the United States is consistently pictured as the chief aggressor.

Last January a note of greater war imminence was introduced by Pospelov, head of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, in his Lenin anniversary speech. He cited an alleged record of United States military action against the Soviet Union and quoted Lenin to picture the United States as Russia's most hated enemy. Lenin's "it must be remembered that we are always a hair's breadth away from any invasion," was related to General Eisenhower's arrival in Europe to point out that "the danger of a European war has been brought nearer."

Stalin's Pravda interview on 16 February appeared to be a reaction to the growing strength of the West. His close adherence to the lines of the Communist peace campaign set the stage for the Berlin meeting of the World Peace Council. However, the tone was not entirely one of peace. He described the North Atlantic nations and the Latin American countries as the "aggressive core" of the UN, stated that the Anglo-American forces in Korea would ultimately be defeated, and threatened that war, while not inevitable "at present," may become so. Heretofore, Stalin had merely stated that war was not inevitable if the capitalist world would cooperate with the Soviet Union.

Emphasis on the "peace" line was increased for a time as Soviet propagandists played up Stalin's interview and the World Peace Council's demands for a Five-Power Peace Pact. As soon as the Deputy Foreign Ministers' Conference opened in Paris, however, the "Western aggression" theme rose quantitatively above the "peace" line. The tone of this new aggression approach may have appeared somewhat softened, but only because the economic angle rather than the military aspects of US-Western aggressiveness was being stressed in order to alarm Western European audiences.

Although output on the May Day celebration emphasized the "peaceful coexistence" theme, subsequent propaganda through the month of June revived the term "capitalist encirclement," accenting the global scope of US military bases and the threatening aspects of the Deputy Foreign Ministers' agenda. In fact, the over-all Soviet reaction to the Paris talks was one of violent denunciation of "Western aggression" as

exemplified chiefly by NATO and US bases.

Malik's proposal in June for a cease-fire in Korea initiated another "peace" interval. This, however, did not stop Soviet propagandists from warning against neutrality and defining the aim of capitalist encirclement as "the preparation and unleashing of aggression against the USSR." Further intermingling of diverse propaganda themes during this interval appeared in the Pravda-Morrison exchange, Shvernik's reply to President Truman's expression of America's friendship for the Russian people, and in Moscow's English-language magazine News. During the same period, the official speeches of Voroshilov, Molotov and Zhukov at the Rumanian and Polish holiday celebrations showed no trace of a lessening of the Kremlin's vituperations against the United States.

Immediately following the San Francisco Conference in early September, Soviet propaganda media marked time. Lack of emphasis on any one theme gave the impression that the Kremlin desired to reduce international tension. The opening of the USSR signature campaign for a Five-Power Peace Pact necessarily resulted in a sharp but short-lived rise in attention to the "peace" theme. Loss of face at San Francisco and Moscow's concern over the Pacific defense pacts and the Foreign Ministers and NATO conferences in Washington, Ottawa and Rome, however, soon brought a sharp rise in outright aggression charges.

Moscow's latest official pronouncements -- Stalin's Pravda interview on the atomic bomb and Beriya's address on the occasion of the anniversary of the October Revolution -- were designed for a double psychological effect. The strong, aggressive, and belligerent tone served notice on the West, particularly the United States, that the Soviet Union's position on international issues remains unchanged. At the same time, the statements were designed to bolster Communist confidence in Soviet strength.

Soviet "peace" output is at its lowest point since early January. Although the All-Union Peace Conference which opened in Moscow on 27 November, and the buildup for the International Economic Conference scheduled for April in Moscow, are placing stress on the alleged Soviet desire for peaceful coexistence with capitalist nations, the Kremlin is continuing a basically hard line.

ASPECTS OF JAPAN'S TRADE WITH COMMUNIST CHINA

The hope held by both Japanese and Communist Chinese trade interests that an expanding and profitable commerce could exist despite all political pressures is being dispelled through the restrictions imposed by Tokyo and Peiping. Japan's stringent export controls now prevent the shipment of most of the items which Communist China is willing to accept in exchange for the raw materials which China historically has supplied to Japan.

The significance of prewar Sino-Japanese trade to both economies is illustrated by figures for 1936, the last non-war year, which show that 15 percent of Japan's total foreign trade was with China proper and Manchuria, and 31 percent of their total trade with Japan. Japan's exports to China proper and Manchuria between 1931 and 1939 averaged approximately 200 million dollars annually, or 22 percent of Japan's total exports; in 1950 this figure had decreased to 19.6 million dollars, and in the first seven months of 1951 it amounted to only five million dollars, or less than one percent of Japan's total exports. During August and September of this year, exports to China had dwindled to only 64,000 and 41,000 dollars respectively.

Current SCAP export control policy permits the shipment of non-strategic and non-critical materials to Communist China in exchange for raw materials of critical importance to the Japanese economy. Shipments to Communist China in 1951 consisted primarily of textiles, bicycles, sewing machines and miscellaneous consumer goods in exchange for Chinese soy beans, edible oils, hides and coal. The Japanese Government hopes to obtain coking coal, salt, iron ore and soy beans in future barter deals.

The recent decline in Sino-Japanese trade is due to a reluctance on the part of Chinese Communist authorities to continue importing non-strategic consumer goods from Japan in exchange for materials basically strategic in nature. Recently, a scarcity of textiles has induced them to approve an exchange of coking coal for Japanese cotton goods. The Chinese, however, are not eager to continue this type of trade in view of expanding domestic textile output and the continued availability of textiles from other areas. Consequently, there is little prospect for an immediate resumption of large-scale trade.

The eagerness of Japan's businessmen for trade with Communist China is partly based on the idea that China might again become the market it was in the pre-World War II period. This is unlikely, however, since a

substantial portion of prewar trade represented Japan's expanding investments in Manchuria and North China, and the needs of Japanese living in those areas. Japan would also now find itself competing for trade with the Communist Orbit and with an expanding Chinese industry. This desire for trade, however, is indicative of the strong belief that Japan's uncertain economy cannot afford to depend entirely upon the non-Communist bloc.

Consequently, the Japanese Government already is under strong pressure for the establishment of a modus vivendi with the Communist nations, if it can be accomplished without alienating the United States. Prime Minister Yoshida and other government spokesmen, possibly as a reaction to these pressures, have lately been emphasizing that the China trade is not essential and, in any event, cannot reach prewar proportions. The Japanese, however, can be expected to take full advantage of the fact that Great Britain favors a diversion of Japan's competitive trade from Southeast Asia to Communist China.

There is little question that Japan will continue in the post-treaty period to cooperate in Western export controls. Aside from compelling political and military considerations which bind Japan firmly to the free world, the Japanese are fully aware that their economy for the foreseeable future is far more dependent on the West than upon the Communist bloc. Despite the great appeal of cheap coking coal, soy beans, salt, and iron ore from China, these items can be obtained from other, although more expensive, sources.

On the other hand, such important basic items as food, cotton, wool, oil and rubber are obtainable in adequate quantities only from non-Orbit sources. Moreover, the relative importance of Sino-Japanese trade to both economies is so nearly equal that it is unlikely either nation can use it as a significant political weapon.

General recognition of Japan's political, military and economic dependence on the West undoubtedly accounts in part for the lack of opposition within Japan to the control system covering strategic materials. As far as can be determined, the Japanese business community appears to be making a conscientious effort to conform to current control directives. It is to be expected, however, that the Japanese Government will wish to pattern its post-treaty export policy after those of the Western European countries, rather than continue the stricter controls now imposed by SCAP.

THE COMMONWEALTH AND BRITAIN'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS CRISIS

Great Britain, as part of its efforts to cope with the new balance of payments crisis, will ask for assistance from the other independent members of the sterling area when the Commonwealth Finance Ministers meet next month. Great Britain is primarily concerned with closing the sterling area's dollar gap, but India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa will probably be more interested, at least initially, in their own long-deferred demands for capital goods needed to carry out economic development programs.

These demands, coming at a time when British industry is increasingly occupied with the rearmament program, carry with them an implicit threat to the United Kingdom's ability to maintain its predominant position in what is still the world's largest trading area.

Britain is expected to ask these countries specifically for new reductions in their dollar imports, for continued restraint in drawing upon their growing sterling balances in London until the United Kingdom is again able to export capital goods in quantity, and for "price stabilization" of raw materials in favor of the United Kingdom.

The independent sterling countries, whose over-all contributions to postwar solvency of the sterling area have been less consistent than that of the dependent British territories, have already indicated that their first responses will be dictated by their own internal needs. They will probably reply that heavy equipment and consumer goods now being purchased with dollars cannot be obtained in sufficient quantity within the sterling area; that there seems to be little prospect of Britain's paying off its sterling obligations in capital goods until its rearmament program has been completed; and that raw materials prices, which have dropped sharply since the middle of this year, are already adjusted heavily in Britain's favor.

These divergent attitudes point up the double role that Britain must play if it is to maintain the sterling area as one of the main supports of its position as a world power. As banker for the whole area, the United Kingdom must see that an external equilibrium is maintained with other trading areas. At the same time, Britain must preserve an internal equilibrium between the other members of the sterling area and itself, their principal producer of capital goods. Since early in World War II, however, the sterling area has maintained a formal external equilibrium only by large dollar grants and loans. A formal internal equilibrium has been sustained only by the accumulation on the part of the overseas countries of large sterling balances which cannot be converted immediately into goods or other currencies.

Although substantial progress towards closing the sterling area's dollar gap continued during the first six months of 1951, the problem of Britain's sterling liabilities to the other members became more acute.

For example, while the central gold and dollar reserves increased from an all-time low of 1,340 million dollars in September 1949 to a postwar high of 3,867 million on 30 June 1951, the sterling balances held by overseas countries increased from a sterling equivalent of 6,586 million dollars at the end of 1949 to 8,675 million on 30 June 1951. Moreover, in the reduction of the sterling area's dollar gap, Britain's contribution — exclusive of colonial earnings — consisted only of reducing its own annual dollar deficit from 2,316 million dollars in 1947 to 300 million in 1950. The overseas countries on the other hand, with the help of abnormally high sales of raw materials to the US since the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, earned large dollar surpluses; and as a result there were unofficial statements in those countries that they, as independent dollar earners, ought to be allowed to buy dollar goods with these earnings.

In the third quarter of this year, there was a reversal in the sterling area's dollar position which led to the current crisis. This development was due not only to the cessation of abnormal sales by the overseas countries, but also to a large increase in the rate of dollar imports by the United Kingdom. Dollar deficits are now tentatively forecast for all independent sterling area countries in 1951.

The British consider cuts in dollar purchases as the most effective short-term means of reducing the dollar gap. Their decision to cut non-sterling imports by nearly 1,000 million dollars annually will probably prompt a similar request to the overseas countries. Most of these countries, despite their disclaimers, have liberalized their import policies in the past year and have evidently been making large non-sterling purchases. In the 1949 payments crisis, when British industry seemed well on its way to resuming peacetime production, the Commonwealth Finance Ministers agreed to an average cut of 25 percent in their dollar imports. Now, however, the overseas countries must reconcile their loyalties to the sterling area with their poorer prospects for obtaining with their sterling resources the equipment needed to carry out their long-term development programs.

It is generally agreed that the long-term solution of the sterling area's financial difficulties depends primarily upon Britain's ability to increase its exports of capital goods to other sterling area countries. Although Britain now plans to give higher priority to such exports, the competing demands of the rearmament program mean that even partial fulfillment of the overseas countries' needs would call for an enormous increase in British coal and steel production. Britain's rearmament program will leave even less capital goods available for export to sterling countries.

Since the sterling area's gold and dollar reserves are considered large enough to forestall an early financial collapse, and since the drain on these reserves is not expected to continue at its present high rate, the overseas countries may well insist that the problem of growing sterling balances is as serious as the dollar deficit. Although both sides at the Commonwealth Finance Ministers' meeting will probably realize the need for

continued cooperation in confronting the sterling area's difficulties, the attitude of the overseas countries on sterling balances will necessarily constitute an additional pressure upon the United Kingdom's rearmament program.

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ANTI-COMMUNIST ACTIVITY CONTINUES THROUGHOUT POLAND

Anti-regime activity throughout Poland since August appears to have been on at least as high a level as a year ago, even in areas where the government has made special efforts to suppress resistance. As in the past several years, acts of sabotage have been carried out by small bands of partisans and not by groups under the control of the existing organized underground, which remains passive.

Escaped Polish refugees have reported that as late as last September small units of anti-Communist partisans were operating in the forest areas of Bialystok Province in eastern Poland.

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In Lublin Province to the south at least four Security Police operations were carried out from 19 October through 2 November. At least twelve collaborators of sought-after bands were arrested, but in none of these operations, despite the relatively large number of troops involved, were the bands themselves captured.

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forty persons were arrested in October for sabotaging and putting out of commission two furnaces of the Batory Ironworks in Katowice. In early November he reported a trial in Krakow at which the condemned were accused of assassinating the secretary of a local Communist cell and of beating up several party members. The latter incidents occured near Wolbrom where similar acts led to a trial in Krakow last January.

Armed bands were reportedly active in mid-September in the wooded hilly area between Krakow and Przemysl in southern Poland, killing Communist officials and Security Police. On 9 September, one of Polish Radio's star commentators was killed by an armed band which broke into his apartment and shot him. In the vicinity of Gorzow in western Poland, an underground group has been conducting raids on the local Communist Party headquarters.

These reports, coming from all parts of Poland, indicate that the anti-Communist population, perhaps in part motivated by the increasingly serious shortages of basic consumer supplies, is becoming more willing to strike back against the regime and that their will to resist has not been broken despite the imposition of additional security measures. The bands operating in Poland, though small, tie down a disproportionately large number of the Security Police in a country which is becoming increasingly short of manpower

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

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THE COUP D'ETAT IN THAILAND

The coup d'etat on 29 November in Thailand resulted in the seizure of de facto control of the Thai Government by a nine-man group of military leaders headed by the Army Commander, General Phin. This junta immediately abolished the Parliament and replaced the existing constitution with one promulgated in 1932 which facilitates centralized authority. The committee then returned all executive functions to a reshuffled cabinet led by Premier Phibun.

These moves were clearly designed to complete the domination of Thailand by the military and to perpetuate it. The cabinet shakeup involved the replacement of independent ministers with loyal military supporters. The constitutional change strengthened the military clique's position by reducing the King's powers and reestablishing a unicameral legislature, one-half of whose membership is appointed by the cabinet.

The timing of this coup to coincide with the return of the King from his studies in Switzerland for permanent residence was also significant. The junta undoubtedly wished to be firmly entrenched before the King arrived in Bangkok, and thus to profit from the national veneration for the monarchy. In addition, it will now be difficult for the King to deal with political factions hostile to the military.

For the present, the authority of the military leaders appears to be unquestioned. Thailand's anti-Communist policies and Western orientation will not be altered, and the retention of Phibun as Premier should assure a certain degree of political peace. Lasting stability in Thailand is by no means assured, however. The coup has undoubtedly augmented the number of the government's political opponents, and this opposition will become more embittered if, as is expected, the government acts in an increasingly authoritarian manner.

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PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE WEST SHOW SIGNS OF DETERIORATION

Despite protestations to the contrary, Pakistan has apparently embarked upon a course of action designed to suggest a cooling of relations with the West. Its immediate aim seems to be a quick solution of the Kashmir question. Continued delay in effecting a settlement might lead to a real rift between Pakistan and the West and to a closer alignment of that nation with the Islamic bloc.

Several recent diplomatic actions illustrate Pakistan's tactics. The Pakistani Foreign Minister made a speech before the UN General Assembly on 14 November, in which he condemned colonialism and the domination of white over colored peoples. Pakistan also made a joint submission to the General Assembly on 26 November, along with Syria and Iraq, of a resolution calling for Big Four talks on disarmament.

The Pakistani Government was presumably aware that these moves would embarrass either Great Britain or the United States. Still more recent was Pakistan's hesitancy to accept US economic aid on the terms on which it has been offered. There had previously been no hint of a possible refusal.

To some extent, this trend away from the West may be explained by the assassination of pro-Western Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and his replacement by a more conservative, orthodox Moslem, who may be expected to exhibit greater interest in Islamic affairs and the unity of the Moslem world. In larger part, the trend probably results from Pakistan's pique at the UN Security Council's continued failure to take firm action against India on the Kashmir question, for which failure Pakistan blames the United States and Great Britain.

Pakistan is unlikely to provoke war with India as a means of settling the Kashmir problem. Short of war, there is little Pakistan can do to hinder India's consolidation of its position in the disputed state. Pakistan therefore seems to have decided to exert pressure on the West rather than on India in an effort to obtain a solution.

SPECIAL ARTICLE

SOVIET DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGN AGAINST WESTERN REARMAMENT

The new series of Soviet diplomatic notes protesting developments in Europe and the Near East is a reaction to Western initiatives which are making the North Atlantic Treaty Organization a growing threat to the USSR. By the same tactic, the Soviet Union is seeking to counteract the extension of this alliance system through the Eastern Mediterranean, where the USSR feels itself particularly vulnerable to attack.

The Soviet notes, which are also designed to prepare a record of protest on which the USSR can base future action, include the following:

11 September	-	to France on German remilitarization
1 October	-	to Norway on war graves
11 October	-	to the Western Powers on revision of Italian peace treaty
15 October	-	to Norway on bases
19 October	-	answer to France on German remilitarization
31 October	-	answer to Norway on war graves
4 November	-	to Turkey on adherence to NATO
12 November	-	answer to Norway on bases
17 November	-	to the Western Powers on base at Trieste
21 November	-	to Arab states and Israel on Middle East Command
21 November	-	to the United States on appropriations for subversive activities
24 November	-	to the Western Powers and Turkey on Middle East Command

The determination of the Western Powers to override Soviet opposition at San Francisco, and the subsequent impetus given to Western rearmament by the meetings at Washington, Ottawa and Rome, impressed the USSR with the seriousness of Western rearmament. Intensive Soviet diplomatic activity occurred during other critical periods of NATO evolution, notably in early 1949 with its formation and in late 1950 following the Western decisions on German rearmament.

The USSR may still hope to hinder fruition of NATO in Europe by emphasizing once again its strong objections to the "aggressive" nature and aims of the alliance. The USSR probably has a greater expectation of blocking its extension to the Near East because of inflamed nationalism in the Arab states, which jeopardizes military cooperation in that area.

The Soviet notes directed toward Europe were aimed at West German

rearmament, the establishment of NATO bases in Norway, revision of the Italian peace treaty, and the status of Trieste -- all of which are closely tied to the Western defense effort.

The current phase of the campaign against NATO was inaugurated in early September by a Soviet note to France which charged that the Pleven and Schuman plans were fostering German remilitarization. The timing and tone of the note suggested an effort to intimidate France on the eve of tripartite talks in Washington, but the French Government maintained a firm stand.

Two Soviet notes to Norway were directed at another facet of Western defense, the strengthening and extension of NATO bases. Norway was accused of violating its treaty commitments and its previous assurances to the Soviet Union by making its territory available for such bases. Concurrently, two strong protests on a relatively minor issue -- Norwegian movement of Soviet war graves -- were probably intended to increase the feeling of strained relations in order to influence Norway's attitude toward NATO bases. Official Norwegian opinion was not unduly disturbed but the government, while remaining steadfast in its commitment to NATO, is now likely to be even more circumspect in negotiations over bases.

A Soviet note to the three Western Powers rejecting their proposal for revision of the Italian peace treaty, as desired by Italy, maintains that the proposal was aimed at more effectively utilizing Italy as a member of NATO. Moscow laid down as one condition for revision of the treaty Italy's withdrawal from NATO. Italy, however, is unlikely to swerve from its present policy supporting NATO.

Closely connected with the Italian treaty is the question of Trieste, which was the subject of still another note to the Western Powers. The USSR charged that Trieste was being converted into a military and naval base linked to the North Atlantic bloc. The note, which took cognizance of a possible Italo-Yugoslav agreement on Trieste, probably reflected Russian concern that successful negotiations on this issue might lead to a rapprochement between the two countries and Yugoslavia's eventual cooperation with NATO.

The current effort to expand the scope of NATO by creating a Middle East Command, which would embrace the eastern Mediterranean countries as well, evoked a Soviet attempt to deter the Arab states and Israel from participating in such an arrangement. In the Near East, as opposed to Western Europe, where the NATO program has not only been accepted but partially carried out, Moscow has a far greater opportunity to disrupt Western plans. The USSR, quick to exploit the lead taken by Egypt in opposing the Middle East Command, recently issued notes warning the Arab states against adherence. This move, which directly supports current Arab disaffections and aspirations, seeks to arouse suspicion of the

Western defense plan as a cover for occupation by foreign troops and the reestablishment of spheres of influence.

Moscow apparently considered Greek and Turkish membership in NATO an inevitable confirmation of their ties to the West, and therefore limited itself to a propaganda attack against these countries at the time of their acceptance in mid-September 1951. The official Soviet warning to Turkey against joining NATO, not delivered until 4 November, merely rounded out Moscow's current documentation of protests to NATO countries. Neither this note nor the protest addressed to Turkey and the three Western powers on their sponsorship of the Middle East Command has influenced Turkey's firm Western orientation.

The series of notes gives no hint of Moscow's future intentions. The notes emphasize that the Soviet Union "cannot remain indifferent" to developments that affect its special interests in Spitsbergen and "the outlet to the sea in the West," which are described as of "extraordinarily great importance to the Soviet Union and the security of the north." Similar language was used to protest the establishment of military bases on Turkish soil at the frontiers of the USSR, but to date, there have been no signs of Soviet retaliatory measures in these areas.

It is impossible to determine, on the basis of present evidence, what these warnings portend. Present disarmament talks at the UN provide the Soviet Union with an opportunity to demonstrate any willingness to initiate serious negotiations.

Recent suggestions for four power talks have generally met with a cool Soviet response, however, with the implication that any negotiations will have to hinge on discussion of the whole Western rearmament program. The protest notes have presumably, to the satisfaction of the Kremlin, established a firm basis for the Russian argument in any Four Power conference which may take place.